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The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws adopted a Uniform Trusts Act at their meeting held
at Kansas City, Missouri, on September 2o-25, 1937. Work on
this Act began in 1931 and the six successive drafts through
which it passed were subjected to the scrutiny of many agencies
including committees of the American Bar Association, the Illi-
nois and Minnesota Bar Associations, Association of American
Law Schools, and others. A prefatory note to the Act states its
purpose to be "(i) To do away with a few obsolete and unjust
rules of trust law which have come about through unfortunate
judicial decisions or are survivals of ancient property lawi
(z) To clarify and tighten the rules regarding loyalty by a
trustee to the interests of his beneficiary; (3) To relax a few
equity rules regarding trust administration, under careful re-
striction, in order to facilitate convenience in the administration
of trusts." The Act, then, is in no sense a comprehensive trust
code but rather comprises several largely unrelated sections
each dealing with specific problems. It is not, therefore, essen-
* This article appears in the current issue of the University of Cincinnati
Law Review.
f University of Cincinnati Law School.
The Ohio State University College of Law.
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tial that it should be adopted in any state as a unit, and any sec-
tion or sections could be omitted from the act without serious
danger to any continuity or unity. The only sacrifice such omis-
sions would occasion would be in uniformity, a sacrifice not to
be too lightly made.
The legislature of Ohio has passed many of the uniform
laws adopted by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
and this new proposal will undoubtedly come before it for con-
sideration. The purpose of this article is to study the Act with
reference to the existing case and statute laws of Ohio in order
to present the changes which would be entailed in its adoption.
The study will be made under the three purposes suggested in
the prefatory note of the Commissioners and in the order above
stated.
I. REMOVAL OF OBSOLETE OR UNJUST RULES
Section 2
i. Whenever a bank account shall, by entries made on the books
of the depositor and the bank at time of the deposit, be created exdu-
sively for the purpose of paying dividends, interest or interest coupons,
salaries, wages, or pensions, or other benefits to employees, and the
depositor at the time of opening such account does not expressly
otherwise declare, the depositor shall be deemed a trustee of such
account for the creditors to be paid therefrom, subject to such power
of revocation as the depositor may have reserved by agreement with
the bank.
2. If any beneficiary for whom such trust is created does not
present his claim to the bank of payment within one year after it is
due, the depositor who created such trust may revoke it as to such
creditor.
The primary purpose of this section is to do away with the
diversity which exists in the case law as to the status of these
special accounts. When a corporation opens a coupon account
in its bank to meet maturities of interest coupons on its bonds,
its has been held that the bank becomes a trustee of the depos-
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ited funds for the purpose of paying the claimants.' Other
authorities view the bank only as a debtor of the depositor
corporation in such cases.2 Some courts regard the corporation
as trustee of an account it creates to pay dividends3 but not of
an account created to pay interest coupons.' The distinction
appears unwarranted.' In each case the corporation owes a debt,
created by issuing the bonds or declaring the dividend, and is
setting aside some of its property to pay it. In neither case is
the bank properly regarded as a trustee, but rather as the debtor
of its depositor. The intention of the ordinary depositor, in the
light of established banking practice, is presumably that the
bank is free to use the funds deposited for its own purposes.
The depositor, however, by opening such an account, seems to
designate one of its assets, i.e., the claim against the bank arising
from the deposit, to be used for the sole purpose of paying the
particular class of its creditors. Hence the depositor holds the
claim in trust for them.6 Similar reasoning applies to other
1 Portland Bldg. Co. v. State Bank of Portland, io Ore. 61, z22 Pac.
740 (1924). In Diebold Safe and Lock Co. v. Fulton, 49 Ohio App. 5x6
0934)
, 
the Company had a special payroll account in its bank. A fund was
given to the bank to meet a particular payroll, no deposit in the account being
directed. An uninformed teller made the deposit in the special payroll
account. The bank failed and the court held the deposit to be a trust fund,
Sherick, P. J., saying: "It is a generally accepted rule that where there is a
deposit in a bank for the special purpose of meeting certain checks, or a class
of checks, and the bank has full knowledge of this purpose, and the special
account is used for no other purpose, the account is not a general deposit in
which title thereto passes to the bank and the relationship of debtor and cred-4
itor (is) established, but such is a special deposit . . . and is a fund impressed
with a trust, and, upon the bank's insolvency, such deposit is entitled to prefer-
ence over the bank's general creditors. . . . " In Kopp Clay Co. v. Fulton,
I25 Ohio St. 512, i8z N.E. 494 (932), while the fact was not in issue,
the court seems to consider a deposit in a special payroll account as a special
deposit.
2 Fralick v. Coeur D'Alene Bank, 36 Idaho io8, 2IO Pac. 586 (1922),
two judges dissenting; 32 Yale L. J. 85i (1923).
a In re Interborough Consol. Corp., 267 Fed. 914 (D.C.N.Y., i9zo).
'In re Interborough Consol. Corp., 288 Fed. 334 (C.C.A. 2nd, 19Z3).
Compare Guidise v. Island Refining Corp., 291 Fed. 922 (D.C.N.Y., 1923).
5 See 19 Ill. L. Rev. 429 (1925); 35 Yale L. J. 634 (19z6). Compare
z8 Col. L. Rev. 477 (1928).
6 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) sec. 20.
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types of purpose accounts, such as special accounts to pay em-
ployees wages, pensions, or other benefits.' Section 2 therefore
adopts the solution closest to banking realities and* the normal
intention of the parties. The bank in which such accounts are
established does not become trustee of the funds deposited.
This is so whether or not the same bank happens to be trustee
of other property transferred to it by the depositor to secure
obligation held by the particular class of the depositor's cred-
itors, e.g., bondholders.8 The clause in the section, "and the
depositor at the time of opening such account does not expressly
otherwise declare," makes it possible for the parties, depositor
and depositary, to stipulate that the latter should be trustee, or
that neither party should be.
The existence of the power of the depositor to revoke the
trust and thereafter to use the balance of the account for other
purposes is rightly made a fact question by the last sentence of
the first subsection. Even though such power to revoke has not
been reserved, the expiration of the one-year period of limita-
tion in the second subsection gives the depositor such power as
to the unclaimed balance. In either event, of course, these pro-
visions do not mean that the claimant loses his position as gen-
eral creditor of the depositor. They simply give the depositor
power to destroy the standing of the creditor as beneficiary by
revoking the trust. Since this subsection gives the claimant one
year to "present his claim to the bank," it seemingly applies in
two cases: (i) where the bank disburses as fiscal agent of the
depositor-trustee; and (2) where the depositor itself disburses
by check on the account and presentment of the check to the
drawee bank is not made within the period.
7 Bogert, op. cit., supra, note 6. Compare Diebold Safe & Lock Co. v.
Fulton, supra, note i.
8 Guidise v. Island Refining Corp., supra, note 4; Fralick v. Coeur
D'Alene Bank, supra, note z. But the indenture creating the bank trustee for
security may govern the relationship as to funds deposited with the same bank
to meet interest payments. See Steel Cities Chemical Co. v. Virginia-Carolina
Chemical Co., 7 F. (2nd) 28o (C.C.A. znd, 1925) and discussion, 35 Yale
L. J. 634, 635 (i926).
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When a depositor has furnished his bank with funds to see
a creditor paid, the problem of the relations of depositor, cred-
itor, and bank arises most frequently after either depositor or
bank has failed. In case either goes insolvent, has the creditor
been elevated to the preferred position of beneficiary with the
insolvent as trustee? Section 2 settles the question as to the
types of creditors listed therein, affirming their position as bene-
ficiaries of the account upon insolvency of the depositor and
therefore inferentially denying it as to the funds deposited upon
insolvency of the bank. But even as to the types of creditors
named in the section the statute only settles the question when
"a bank account shall . . .be created exclusively" for purpose
of paying them. The words, "bank account" and "created" are
capable of two constructions. They may be strictly construed
only to cover cases where a special account is opened by the
depositor; or they may be broadly construed to include any case
in which the bank is provided by its depositor with funds to pay
the classes of creditors named in the statute. In a leading Ohio
caseo a depositor drew its check on a general account which it
maintained on the commercial side of a Bank and Trust Com-
pany, and sent it to the trust department of the same bank to
be used in meeting principal and interest maturities. The trust
department put the check through and was credited by the com-
mercial department under "Uninvested Trust Funds," appar-
ently a general ledger account maintained by the trust depart-
ment. After failure of the Bank and Trust Company it was held
that the transaction made the institution trustee of the funds,"
but the court approved and followed a previous Ohio case'1
holding that a aeposit of trust funds by the trust department in
the commercial department, permitted by section 71o-165 of
the Ohio Banking Act, created the relation of debtor-creditor,
'Fultoz v. Uviversity of Dayton, i29 Ohio St. 9o , 193 N.E. 758
(1934).
"The security indenture contained provisions strengthening this conclu-
sion. z9 Ohio St., at p. 95.
"McDoxaidv. Fulton, 1z5 Ohio St. 507, 18z N.E. 504 (I93z).
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just as if the trustee properly made a general deposit in another
bank. 2. Hence the depositor was not entitled to preferential
payment. A subsequent amendment of section 7o-165"a prob-
ably changes this result. That self-deposit statute now provides
that when such funds are so deposited, if the institution fails its
assets shall be impressed with a trust for payment of the deposit.
Such deposit transactions as this, if they have for their purpose
the payment of claimants listed in Section 2, may be construed to
come within its provisions. If so, there will be no incompat-
ability between that section and the Ohio self-deposit statute.
By Section 2 the sending of funds will not make the bank of
trustee unless express declarations to the contrary are made by
the depositor. Hence the amended Section 7o-165 of the
Banking Act will ordinarily be inapplicable, since the bank will
not be depositing trust funds in another department of the
bank. 4 If, however, the depositor makes a contrary dec-
laration, as provided in Section 2 the bank may be a
trustee of the funds. In such an event a self-deposit
would, under the amended section of the Banking Act, result
in a preference. It is believed, however, that Section 2 of the
Uniform Act was not intended to be construed to include fur-
nishing of funds to a bank for the purposes named unless an
account is thereby literally created for that exclusive purpose.
The relations fixed by the section, i.e., the bank as debtor of
the depositor and the depositor as trustee of the bank's obliga-
tion for the claimant, are not intended to arise unless that is
done. Both an adherence to the exact wording of the section
and a reading of the section as a whole justifies this conclusion.
2 Fulton v. Main, 128 Ohio St. 457, 191 N.E. 742 (1934).
is i15 Ohio Laws 287 (effective June 4, 1933).
14 "We are primarily concerned with the last sentence of this section. It
is dealing with the subject of moneys held by any trust company in trust, that
is, as a trustee, and in language that is dear and concise authorizes it to deposit
money pending distribution or investment in the commercial or other depart-
ment of the bank. We need give attention to the first part of the section only
for the purpose of observing the express distinction made between property
and securities on the one hand, and money, on the other. The former are to
be segregated and kept so." McDonald v. Fulton, supra, 125 Ohio St. at
p. 510. (Italics by the writers).
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Whichever of the above constructions is made of Section 2,
it is dear that the Act fixes the relations of depositor, creditor
and bank in comparatively few of the fact situations in which
such three-party problems arise. The Act has for its primary
purpose only the abolition of "a few obsolete and unjust rules
of trust law," i.e., in Section 2 the doing away with the distinc-
tion between the relationships in coupon and dividend accounts.
Its provisions were extended to cover accounts to pay benefits to
employees on the theory that they were governed by the same
considerations. Other fact situations which may or may not
deserve similar treatment, are left untouched, as, for example,
deposits to meet the principal of the depositor's bonds or notes,"5
to accomplish payment of the depositor's rent,"" to pay the pur-
chase price of material sold by a dealer to the depositor,' to
procure foreign or domestic credit to meet outstanding drafts
or other obligations of the depositor,' 8 and such transactions,"9
whether the deposit is made by the obligor sending funds to his
bank to have the bank perform the task for him,"0 or is made
by the depositor sending an order to his bank to use for the
stipulated purpose a portion of the sum already standing to his
credit in a general account.' The problem of whether the cred-
15 The section being confined to creation of accounts to pay "interest or
interest coupons."
iG See Fulton v. Gardiner, 127 Ohio St. 77, 186 N.E. 724 (I933).
17 See Pontius v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 16 Ohio App. 240 (I92?).
"8 See Eyuitable Trust Co. v. First National Bank, 275 U.S. 359, 72
L. Ed. 313, 48 S. Ct. 167 (1928). Scorr, CASES ON TRuSTS (2nd Ed.) pp.
S9- 6 9 and cases cited.
"See Squire v. Branciforti, 131 Ohio St. 344, 2 N.E. (2nd) 878
(1936) (vendee deposited funds with bank as escrow agent in purchase of real
estate).
20 Where this is the case, the problem of whether the bank is trustee
depends on whether it is intended to use the particular funds deposited solely
for the purpose specified, or is intended to be free to use the particular funds
as its own, merely promising the depositor to perform the task. See RESTATE-
MENT, TRUSTrS (1935) sec. 12, com. (g); Stone, Some Legal Problems In-
volved in the Transmission of Funds, 21 Col. L. Rev. 507 (i921); 6 Minn.
L. Rev. 306 (i922).
21 Where this is the case, assuming the intention to have a trust is present,
in deciding whether the bank is trustee, the chief problem is whether the
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itor has the additional status of trust beneficiary upon the insol-
vency of either depositor or depository2 in such other borderline
trust-debt cases remains one to be solved by application of com-
mon law and banking principles.
8ection z5
Where a person who is a trustee of two or more trusts has
mingled the funds of two or more trusts in the same aggregate of
cash, or in the same bank or brokerage account or other investment,
and a withdrawal is made therefrom by the trustee for his own benefit,
or for the benefit of a third person not a beneficiary or creditor of one
or more of the trusts, or for an unknown purpose, such a withdrawal
shall be charged first to the amount of cash, -credit, or other property
of the trustee in the mingled fund, if any, and after the exhaustion of
the trustee's cash, credit, or other property, then to the several trusts
in proportion to their several interests in the cash, credit, or other
property at the time of the withdrawal.
The purpose of this section is obviously to prevent the ap-
plication of the rule in Clayton's Case" in fixing the loss when
a trustee of two or more trusts has mingled the properties and
has subsequently withdrawn parts of the commingled mass and
dissipated the properties withdrawn. While the authorities are
not in harmony," a number of cases, notably in the Federal
courts, have applied the Clayton Rule in this situation.25 This has
placed the loss in accordance with the rule of thumb of "first
money in is first money out," resulting in an allocation in the
bank has segregated, from its general assets, a res which it may hold in trust.
See Dixon, Trust or Debt? Delivery of a Check to the Trust Department of
the Drawee Bank, 9 Cin. L. Rev. 169 (1935); Faltolt v. University of Day-
ton, supra, note 9; Scott, Cases on Trusts (2nd Ed.) pp. 49-56 and cases cited;
RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS, sec. 87.
22 On the position of the creditor as trust beneficiary or contract bene-
ficiary, see Stone, op. cit., supra, at pp. 508, 524-5; Pontius v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., supra, note 17; BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935), sec. 21, pp.
94, 96.
22 Devaynes v. Noble, I Merivale 572, 35 Eng. Rep. 78 (1816).24 See cases collected in BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, sec. 927.
25 See particularly Io re Bolognesi & Co., 254 Fed. 770 (I918); In re
Walter J. Schmidt & Co., 298 Fed. 314. (1923). Compare Cunningham v.
BroWn, 265 U.S. 1, 13, 68 L. Ed. 693, 44- Sup. Ct. 424 (924).
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inverse order of making the deposits in the commingled fund.
Such a position is manifestly unfair to the group of beneficiaries
whose property merely chances to be deposited at an earlier
time. No reason appears why the loss should not be prorated
among the equally innocent groups of trust beneficiaries accord-
ing to the interests which their respective trusts had in the mass
at time of the trustee's withdrawal. Not merely one group, but
all of them, were unfortunate in having a defaulting trustee.
Hence the utilization of the rule in Clayton's Case in this situa-
tion has met with deserved criticism," and the position adopted
by section I5 has been approved by the American Law Insti-
tute." The passage of the section would involve no change in
the Ohio law. There is no direct decision in this state involving
the problem, but in one case'3 there is a strong dictum favoring
the proportionate adjustment provided for in the Act. To pass
this section would be a simple method of assuring a fair solution
of the problem in Ohio.
Section 16
I. When an interest in real property is conveyed by deed to a
person on a trust which is unenforceable on account of the Statute
of Frauds and the intended trustee or his successor in interest still
holds title but refuses to carry out the trust on account of the Statute
of Frauds, the intended trustee or his successor in interest, except to
the extent that the successor in interest is a bona fide purchaser of
a legal interest in the real property in question, shall be under a duty
to convey the interest in real property to the settlor or his successor in
interest. A court having jurisdiction may prescribe the conditions upon
which the interest shall be conveyed to the settlor or his successor in
interest.
2. Where the intended trustee has transferred part or all of his
interest and it has come into the hands of a bona fide purchaser, the
26 Scott, "The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled with Other
Money." 27 Harv. L. Rev. 125 at 130 (1913). See comments, 3P Yale
L. J. 267 (1922); 28 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1914); io Cin. L. Rev. 278, 284
(1936).
7 RESTATEMENT oi' TRUsrs, sec. 202, Comment (n) (1935).
2 Schutt v. Bates, 33 Ohio App. 303 (1929).
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intended trustee shall be liable to the settlor or his successor- in interest
for the value of the interest thus transferred at the time of its transfer,
less such offsets as the court may deem equitable.
This section adopts the minority view in the United States
on the question involved so far as the court decisions are con-
cerned." The position taken, however, is one approved by
eminent scholars,"0 and requires restitution to the settlor or his
successors in all cases, instead of awarding the property to the
intended beneficiaries by the imposition of a constructive trust
for them.3
The section makes no distinction between cases in which the
trustee acted in good faith when he received the deed upon oral
trust for a third party and cases in which he was guilty of actual
fraud, undue influence and the like in the acquisition of the
property. In the latter situation the writers believe that much
is to be said for the result that the oral trustee should be com-
pelled to hold for the third party, against whom it seems the
wrong is actually committed, 2 and in whose favor many courts
have raised a constructive trust.3 However, a strong case. has
been made for restitution to the settlor even in that situation."
Since the major problem is whether the oral trustee shall be
allowed to retain the land, and the section correctly provides
that he shall not do so, it may be desirable to have a dear and
definite result and not to have the provision laden with excep-
tions.
Since the Ohio Legislature has never passed statutes equiv-
19 BOGERT, op. cit., sec. 495, where the cases are collected.
3 0 Ames, "Constructive Trusts Based upon a Breach of Express Oral Trust
of Land." 2o Harv. L. Rev. 549 (1907). Scott, "Conveyances upon Trusts
Not Properly Declared." 37 Harv. L. Rev. 653 (974). Stone, "Resulting
Trusts an dthe Statute of Frauds," 6 Col. Law Rev. 3z6 (19o6). BOGERT,
op. cit., sec. 497.
31 See Costigan, "Trusts Based on Oral Promises to Hold in Trust to
Convey or to Devise Made by Voluntary Grantees," I2 Mich. Law Rev.
430 (1914).
32 Scott, op. cit., 37 Harv. L. Rev. at 667-8.
33 BOGERT, op. cit., secs. 495-6.
34 BOGERT, Op. Cit., pp. 1597-1599.
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alent to Section VII of the English Statute of Frauds, which
required the creation of trusts of land to be manifested and
proved by a writing, the problem involved in Section 16 does
not arise in Ohio. The absence of a Statute of Frauds respecting
trusts has made it possible for our courts frequently to engraft
an oral trust onto an absolute deed of real property where the
evidence is "dear and convincing."" Accordingly, this section
should be omitted in case the Ohio Legislature passes the Uni-
form Act.
The section under consideration only covers the deed cases.
There is great need for a similar provision to cover the absolute
devise and bequest cases, which problem does exist in Ohio."
There is a conflict in the decisions, not upon the major question
whether the devisee may keep; but with respect to the person
or persons for whom the constructive trust shall be imposed.
The writers would favor the preparation of another section
which would work a more complete consistency in result by
compelling substantial restitution to the estate of the settlor in
the case of an absolute devise upon oral trust. That problem,
however, is not induded in the present Act.
Section X2
x. Whenever a trustee shall make a contract which is within his
powers as trustee, or a predecessor trustee shall have made such a
contract, and a cause of action shall arise thereon, the party in whose
favor the cause of action has accrued may sue the trustee in his rep-
resentative capacity'" and any judgment rendered in such action in
favor of the plaintiff shall be collectible [by execution] out of the
trust propetT. In such an action the plaintiff need not prove that
the trustee could have secured reimbursement from the trust fund
if he had paid the plaintiff's claim.
2. No judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff in
35 See 40 Ohio Jur. sees. 32, 33, 87, 88, where cases are collected. See also
Vanneman, "The Constructive Trust, A Neglected Remedy in Ohio, IO Cin.
L. Rev. 366, 379-385 (1936).
"0 Winder v. Scholey, 83 Ohio St. 204, 93 N.E. io98 (191o). See 40
Ohio Jur. sees. 89-95, inclusive.
'7 Italics ours.
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such action unless he proves that within thirty days after the beginning
of such action, or within such other time as the court may fix, and
more than thirty days prior to obtaining the judgment, he notified
each of the beneficiaries known to the trustee who then had a present
interest, or in the case of a charitable trust, . . . of the existence and
nature of the action. Such notice shall be given by mailing copies
thereof in postpaid envelopes addressed to the parties to be notified
at their last known addresses. The trustee shall furnish the plaintiff
a list of the parties to be notified, and their addresses, within ten days
after written demand therefor, and notification of the persons on
such list shall constitute compliance with the duty placed on the plain-
tiff by this section. Any beneficiary, or in the case of charitable trusts
the [Attorney-General] and any corporation which is a beneficiary
or agency in the performance of such charitable trust, may intervene
in such action and contest the right of the plaintiff to recover.
3. The plaintiff may also hold the trustee who made the contract
personally liable on such contract, if the contract does not exclude
such personal liability. The addition of the word "trustee" or the
words "as trustee" after the signature of a trustee to a contract shall
be deemed prima facie evidence of an intent to exclude the trustee
from personal liability.
This section, if adopted by our Legislature would affect
some sweeping changes in the Ohio case-law. The Common
Law courts refused to recognize the trustee in any representa-
tive capacity. An action at law against him upon any contract
which he made for the trust was personal. A judgment was
rendered against him personally, and execution issued against
his property and, indeed, could not issue against the trust prop-
erty. These Common Law rules are to be found in the Ohio
cases.8 The remedy which was available to the contract-cred-
itor was subrogation in equity, a proceeding through the trustee
to reach his right of exoneration, or indemnity, or perhaps,
"8 Vanneman, "Liability of Trust Estates for Obligations Created by the
Trustee in Ohio," 9 Cin. L. Rev. I (I955), 40 Ohio Jur., p. 197 (1935)-
Payne v. Reck, 6 Ohio App. 327 (1917) (Trustee cannot be sued in repre-
sentative capacity). Manley v. Hunt, I Ohio 258 (1824) (Execution onjudgment against trustee cannot be levied on trust estate). See also Lucht v.
Behnerns, z8 Ohio St. 231 (1876) and Trumpler v. Royer, 18 Ohio App.
151 (1918).
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more recently, his power to charge the trust estate. The extent
of that right was limited to the trustee's ability to reach the trust
estate." This personal liability of the trustee, it should be
observed, is not eliminated by the proposed section. On the
contrary, the third paragraph of the section retains it. What the
section does is to look upon the trust realistically as an economic
enterprise which should itself bear the risks of its administra-
tion."0 The courts manifest a strange unwillingness to make this
change,"1 and the statute, therefore, is deemed desirable in order
to give to the trust estate a legal personality and to recognize
the trustee in his official capacity as a distinct legal person. No
longer will the state of the accounts between trustee and estate,
once so vital," have significance, nor will the trustee's ability to
respond in damages be a condition to reaching the trust estate.
The Act does permit the trustee to exempt himself from liabil-
ity by inserting an exculpatory clause in the contract. Here,
too, the adoption of the statute will modify Ohio case law. By
several decisions, 3 the rule is adopted that the addition to his
signature of words such as "trustee" or "trustee for -- is
merely descriptio personae and does not exempt the trustee
from liability. Under this section it is "deemed primna facie evi-
dence of an intent to exclude the trustee from personal liability."
It is believed that Section 12 makes only such modifications
as are desirable and that it should be adopted as it stands. The
reasons advanced in the cases for refusing to sanction a suit
against a trustee in his representative capacity, viz., the desir-
39 P. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Schmidt, 8 Ohio C.C. 355 (1844). See
Stillman v. Holmes, 9 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 193 (I9O9) and Mills v. Connor,
104 Ohio St. 409, 135 N.E. 616 (i9z).
4 See Stone, "Liability of Trust Estates for the Contracts and Torts of
the Trustees," 2z Col. L. Rev. 527 (192z); Brandeis, "Liability of Trust
Estates on Contracts Made for Their Benefit," 15 Am. L. Rev. 449 (1881);
Scott, "Liabilities Incurred in the Administration of Trusts," z8 Harv. L.
Rev. 725 (1905) (1915); Ati. LAw INSTITUTE RESTATEmENT OF TRUSTS,
secs. 267-271; BOGERT, oP. cit., secs. 712-716.
41 See however, Stillman v. Holmes, note 19, sup4ra.
42 1reJohson, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 548, 552 (I88o).
4340 Ohio Jur., sec. 198.
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ability of safeguarding and holding intact trust estates," seem
outweighed by the desirability of requiring every economic
enterprise to shoulder its own risks.
Section 13
x. A trustee who has incurred personal liability for a tort com-
mitted in the administration of the trust is entitled to exoneration
therefor from the trust property if he has not discharged the claim,
or be reimbursed therefor out of trust funds if he has paid the claim,
if (i) the tort was a common incident of the kind of business activity
in which the trustee was properly engaged for the trust, or (2)
although the tort was not a common incident of such activity, if
neither the trustee nor any officer or employee of the trustee was
guilty of jersonal fault in incurring the liability.
2. If a trustee commits a tort which increases the value of the
trust property, he shall be entitled to exoneration or reimbursement
with respect thereto to the extent of such increase in value, even
though he would not otherwise be entitled to exoneration or reim-
bursement.
3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to change the existing
law with regard to the liability of trustees of charitable trusts for torts
of themselves or their employees.
There has always been some doubt respecting the trustee's
right to exoneration or reimbursement for torts and there is
scant authority in the cases.45 Reimbursement for a tort feasor
seems to have been a bit difficult for the court of equity to
achieve. No Ohio case setting out the rule with respect to the
problem has been found. From some of the cases cited under
the next section certain inferences are permissible that the right
might exist. It is well, therefore, to have a dearly defined stat-
utory rule in the state. The legislative adoption of this section
would furnish a rule which meets the requirements of sound
principle by a clear catalogue of the instances in which it is
allowed,46 thus properly safeguarding the estate. Intentional
wrongs by the trustee would be excluded and the troublesome
"Deschler v. Franklin, ix Ohio C. Dec. x88 (19oo). (A tort case).
4 BOGERT, Op. cit., sec.734.
4 BOGERT, Op. cit., p. 2174.
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negligent wrongs would be included only if they were "a com-
mon incident of the kind of business activity" the trustee was
properly performing. This section is far from self executing
and its application will require discriminating judicial admin-
istration, but the rule appears to be well framed and workable."
It is consistent with the principles insisted upon in comments to
the last section and makes more certain the imposition of estate
liability dealt with in the following section. Furthermore it
seems entirely proper, as is provided in the second subsection,
that where the estate of the beneficiary is enriched by a wrong
of the trustee reimbursement to the extent of the benefit con-
ferred be permitted in any case.
Section 14
I. Where a trustee or his predecessor has incurred personal liabil-
ity for a tort committed in the course of his administration, the trustee
in his representative capacity may be sued and collection had from the
trust property, if the court shall determine in such action that (I) the
tort was a common incident of the kind of business activity in which
the trustee or his predecessor was properly engaged for the trust; or
(2) that, although the tort was not a common incident of such activ-
ity, neither the trustee nor his predecessor, nor any officer or employee
of the trustee or his predecessor, was guilty of personal fault in incur-
ring the liability; or (3) that, although the tort did not fall within
classes (I) or (2) above, it increased the value of the trust property.
If the tort is within classes (I) or (2) above, collection may be had
of the full amount of damage proved; and if the tort is within class
(3) above, collection may be had only to the extent of the increase
in the value of the trust property.
2. In an action against the trustee in his representative capacity
under this section the plaintiff need not prove that the trustee could
have secured reimbursement from the trust fund if he had paid the
plaintiff's claim.
3. No judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff in
such action unless he proves that within thirty days after the begin-
47 The comments to the Restatement of Trusts appear less liberal than the
present section. It is there stated that "if the trustee was at fault in incurring
the tort liability, he is not entitled to indemnity." Am. Law Inst., op. cit.,
sec. 247, comment (d) cf. BOGERT, op. cit., at p. 2175.
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ning of the action, or within such other period as the court may fix and
more than thirty days prior to obtaining the judgment, he notified
each of the beneficiaries known to the trustee who then had a present
interest of the existence and nature of the action. Such notice shall
be given by mailing copies thereof in postpaid envelopes addressed to
such beneficiaries at their last known addresses. The trustee shall
furnish the plaintiff a list of such beneficiaries and their addresses,
within ten days after written demand therefor, and notification of
the persons on such list shall constitute compliance with the duty
placed on the plaintiff by this section. Any beneficiary may intervene
in such action and contest the right of the plaintiff to recover.
4. The trustee may also be held personally liable for any tort
committed by him, or by his agents or employees in the course of their
employments, subject to the rights of exoneration or reimbursement
provided in Section 13.
5. Nothing in this section shall be construed to change the exist-
ing law with regard to the liability of trustees of charitable trusts for
torts of themselves or their employees.
The adoption of this section is needed to clarify the problem
in Ohio. In the earliest local case tort creditors seem to be
denied any recovery for their injury against the trust estate and
the trustee's personal liability was conceded.48 A reversal, with-
out opinion, by the Supreme Court," does not render the solu-
tion of the problem any simpler. Whether a suit against the
trustee in his representative capacity is permissible is not clear.
It seems to have been assumed in a Court of Appeals case, 0
and it is dearly possible with respect to receivers." This section
plainly permits representative suits against the trustee by the
victim of the tort and imposes liability on the trust estate. To
the extent that this liability is imposed, the statute is advancing
the responsibility of the property embarked upon an economic
enterprise for the risks of its administration and is relieving the
victim pro tanto of an unjust burden. By way of expansion one
48 Deschler v. Franklin, i i Ohio C. Dec. 188 (19oo).
49 66 Ohio St. 656, 65 N.E. 1129 (1902).
19 Waite v. Mendenhall, et al., 17 Ohio App. 53 (1922).
" Brown v. Winterbottom, 98 Ohio St. 127, 12o N.E. 292 (1918). See
Vanneman, op. cit., 9 Cin. Law Rev. i at pp. 16 et seq.
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might argue that it would be sound policy to hold the economic
enterprise for all wrongs done innocent victims, even including
intentional wrongs of the trustee. It is obvious however that
there is unity and continuity running through sections 12, 13
and 14, and it is believed that they should be considered and
adopted together, preserving this unity of purpose.
II. THE TRUSTEE'S DUTY OF LOYALTY
The duty of undivided loyalty owed by a trustee to his
beneficiary in the administration of the trust is a tradition in
equity. It entails the most rigorous standard to be found in any
jural relationship. In general the equity courts have resisted all
efforts to weaken this duty by the "disintegrating erosion" of
exceptions." It is thought to be good policy to continue the
strictest standard in order to remove all temptation of disloyalty
from the trustee. Nevertheless, trustees continue to be tempted
and such abuses as are found in trust administration commonly
arise from a breach of some rule imposed to secure the duty of
loyalty. Thus, the commissioners, in their prefatory note to
this act say, "It is felt that many of the abuses of modern trust
administration have come from indirect disloyalty of the trustee
and that a clear statement of the full implications of the loyalty
duty might help in securing honest administration." Five sec-
tions are included in the act for this purpose.
Section 3
Except as provided in Section 4, no corporate trustee shall lend
trust funds to itself or an affiliate, or to any director, officer, or em-
ployee of itself or of an affiliate; nor shall any non-corporate trustee
lend trust funds to himself, or to his relative, employer, employee,
partner, or other business associate.
Section 4
I. A corporate trustee which is subject to regulation and super-
vision by state or federal authorities may deposit with itself trust funds
r2 Meinhard v. Salmof;, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). See
generally, Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 5zx
(936).
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which are being held necessarily pending investment, distribution, or
the payment of debts, provided it pays into the trust for such deposit
such interest as it is required by statute to pay on uninvested trust
funds, or, if there be no such statute, the same rate of interest it pays
upon similar non-trust deposits, and maintains in its trust department
as security for all such deposits a separate fund consisting of securities
legal for trust investments and at all times equal in total market value
to the amount of the deposits. But no such security shall be required
to the extent that the deposit is insured or given a preference by any
state or federal law.
2. The separate fund of securities shall be marked as such. With-
drawals from or additions to it may be made from time to time, as
long as the required value is maintained. The income of such secur-
ities shall belong to the corporate trustee. In all statements of its
financial condition published, or delivered to [the state banking de-
partment] such corporate trustee shall show as separate items the
amount of trust funds which it has deposited with itself and the
amount of securities which it holds as security for the payment of such
deposits.
The older cases forbade a trustee, corporate or otherwise,
to deposit funds with itself, or in its commercial department,
and Section 3 of the new Act adopts that rule with Section 4 as
an exception. The duty of loyalty required the trustee to forego
all thought of selfish gain. By depositing trust funds with itself
or affiliate it reaps, at least in some cases, a small advantage for
itself in that it may use the funds as its own while on deposit
either without payment of any interest, or a very low rate of
interest. Loyalty requires that every consideration of details of
administration be decided solely in the interest of the cestui que
trust, and that all gains belong to the beneficiary.
Furthermore, in selecting a depository the trustee should
always use the utmost care to scrutinize its soundness and re-
sponsibility. Unbiased scrutiny cannot be expected when the
depository is the same person, and the depositor is in effect
appraising himself. It is very significant that the American Law
Institute states the rule of Section 3 without qualification.53 The
5 R STATEMENT op TRusTs, sec. 170. Comment (m).
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provision there is, "A trust company or bank which makes in its
own banking department a general deposit of funds held by it
as trustee thereby commits a breach of trust, since in so doing,
it is dealing as an individual with itself as trustee." Following
paragraphs, however, indicate that this is permitted by statute
in some states. Legislative relaxations of the rules growing out
of the duty of loyalty are dangerous for the reason that they
are very often the result of agitation and active lobbying by the
very persons upon whom the strict rule operates. This is not
always true, of course. For example, in Connecticut the relaxa-
tion came through the court decision and the thorough state
supervision and control of banks and trust companies was ad-
vanced by that court as justification for the change."4
The Ohio Legislature has passed a statute dealing with this
problem of deposits by a trustee with himself. General Code,
Section 7o-165, permits a trust company to make deposits of
moneys held pending distribution or investment with itself or
its own banking department."5 In a leading case the Supreme
Court held that such a deposit was a general one giving rise to
a debtor-creditor relationship." In 1933, subsequent to this
decision, the statute was amended so as to give a preferred claim
for moneys so deposited in the event of insolvency of the depos-
itory. It is submitted that an arbitrary preference by statute,
when there is no requirement, and little possibility, of resorting
"
4 Hayward v. Plant, 98 Conn. 374 (1923). See criticism 23 Col. L.
Rev. 465 (1923).
55 Sec. 71o-165 was passed as part of the Banking Act in 1919 (108 Ohio
L. Part I, 8o, izz). In 1932, sec. 1O5O6-45 prescribed the requirements for
the deposit of funds by fiduciaries, including testamentary trustees. The last
sentence of this section provides: "A corporate fiduciary authorized by law to
receive deposits of fiduciaries, shall have authority to be the depository of funds
held by it as such fiduciary." The purpose of this provision was apparently to
complement the existing sec. 71o-165. It would seem that the provision in
sec. 105o6-45 merely gives the- authority to the corporate fiduciary to be a
self-depository, and that the consequences of its being such wil Ibe governed by
the preference provisions of sec. 71o-165 as amended in 1933. See Stickle v.
Guardian Trust Co., 133 Ohio St. 4.72, 14 N.E. (2d) 6oo, 481-483 (1938).
" McDonald v. Fulton, 125 Ohio St. 507, 182 N.E. 504 (1932). See
also Stickel v. Guardian Trust Co., 133 Ohio St. 472 (1938).
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to sound principles of tracing the trust property, is ordinarily
objectionable in the interest of fairness to general creditors of
the depository. In this instance, nevertheless, it has the merit
of avoiding hardship under a statute which permits a limited
fiduciary self-dealing and hence relaxes the corporate trustee's
duty of loyalty." The National Banks must, of course, conform
to the Act of Congress 8 which requires, in such cases, a deposit
of security somewhat similar to that specified in section 4. The
proposed act is so drawn as to fit harmoniously into the state or
Federal scheme, and would involve no great change in Sec.
7 1o- 165, since section 4 provides that "no such security shall be
required to the extent that the deposit is ... given a prefer-
ence by any state ...law." It is quite probable that the
provisions of section 4 with respect to interest, if adopted,
would be an addition to our statutory law."'
Section 5
No trustee shall directly or indirectly buy or sell any property for
the trust from or to itself or an affiliate; or from or to a director,
officer, or employee of such trustee or of an affiliate; or from or to a
relative, employer, partner, or other business associate.
There can be no question about the desirability of a sweep-
ing statutory rule respecting this problem to remove one of the
greatest temptations confronting trustees. The rule as drawn
in this statute is a codification of the Common law rule and
embodies the rigid practice of the better class of trust com-
panies."0 This section, it should be observed, applies to all
trustees, corporate as well as natural persons, whether they are
administering testamentary or non-testamentary trusts. If
adopted in this State it would be an extension to non-testa-
mentary trustees of the same, or virtually the same, statutory
restrictions now obtaining with respect to "fiduciaries," which
57 See 31 Mich. L. Rev. 532 (i933).
58 iz U.S.C.A. 248 k.
" See Gen. Code, sec. I05o6-45.
60 See cases collected BoGERT, op. cit., sec. 489; AMERICAN LAW I.NsI-
TUTE, RESTATEMENT op TRUSTS, sec. 170, Comments (b) to (i) inclusive.
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includes only testamentary trustees.6' This existing Ohio statute
provides that "Fiduciaries shall not buy from or sell to them-
selves . . . except as expressly authorized by the instrument
creating the trust and then only with the approval of the pro-
bate court in each instance; but no corporate fiduciary shall be
permitted to do so, any power in the instrument creating the
trust to the contrary notwithstanding." A proviso exempts au-
thorized advancements. This very stringent section is entirely
proper and its extension to non-testamentary trustees by the
adoption of section 5 is desirable. No reason is perceived why
trustees of living or intervivos trusts should not be governed by
the same principles as testamentary trustees. Any doubt which
may exist of the accountability of the former to the probate
court, 2 and thus of the applicability to them of the principle
embodied in section 10506-49, would, in so far as this problem
is concerned, be rendered unimportant.
It should be observed that section 17, of the Uniform Act
does not permit the prohibitions of sections 3, 4, and 5 to be
removed by stipulations in the trust instrument. In this respect
the present Ohio law respecting fiduciaries is identical, and uni-
formity would be secured in the matter by the adoption of these
sections.
Section 6
No trustee shall as trustee of one trust sell property to itself as
trustee of another trust.
The simplest duties involved in the great principle of loy-
alty would preclude a trustee placing himself in the inconsistent
position of being both buyer and seller. As trustee for the sell-
ing trust his duty is to get the highest price possible; as trustee
for the buying trust it is to pay as small a price as possible.
" Gen. Code, sec. 10506-49.
62 See 40 Ohio Jur. pp. 44o, 441. See also sec. io5o6-i, defining a
fiduciary as a person "appointed by and accountable to the probate court" and
sec. lO501-53, giving the probate court jurisdiction over "testamentary
trustees." And see Ohio Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 8, setting for the jurisdic-
tion of the probate courts.
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The section must be read in connection with sections 17, 18
and 19 which make it possible to avoid its provisions in the
manner there provided.
Section 7
No corporate trustee shall purchase for a trust shares of its own
stock, or its bonds or other securities, or the stock, bonds or other
securities of an affiliate.
Even where there is a limited power in trustees to invest in
corporate stock, as in Ohio, it seems indisputable that a definite
statutory limitation prohibiting the investment of trust funds in
the stock of the corporate trustee or its affiliates is highly desir-
able. The lessons of the depression have emphasized the need
of such a provision.
In Ohio corporation stocks are not legals for investment by
private testamentary trustees." The statutory list, however, is
applicable only to "fiduciaries" as defined in 1O5o6-i, i.e. testa-
mentary trustees.64 Private and corporate trustees of non-testa-
mentary trusts are governed apparently only by the common
law or other statutory provision. The Banking Act permits a
much wider scope of investment to corporate trustees than the
common law allowed to private trustees. " And these latter
investments are apparently saved to corporate testamentary
trustees by the statute governing "fiduciaries" through employ-
ment of the phrase "except as otherwise provided by law" in
introducing the section governing a fiduciary's investment. "
Thus, corporate trustees of both types are permitted to invest in
"stocks and bonds of corporations" when authorized by their
boards of directors or their executive committees.6 This would
probably not permit the investment in stocks or bonds of the
63 Ohio Gen. Code, sec. 105o6-4i.
64 See note 3 9, supra.
65 Ohio Gen. Code, sec. 71o-i66.
6 Sec. IO506-41. Freifield, Investments by Fiduciaries under the New
Ohio Probate Code, 5 Cin. Law Rev. 429 (I93I).
6 Ohio Gen. Code, sec. 71o-i66, sec. 71O-I4ob.
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corporate trustee."' A clear statutory declaration removes all
doubt and section 7 should be adopted.
It should be noted that this section is to be read in connection
with Sections 17, i8, and 19, and their provisions may be
avoided in the manner there provided.
III. RELAXATIONS FOR CONVENIENCE IN ADMINISTRATION.
Considerations of administrative convenience are always
impinging upon strict rule and occasionally a statutory relaxa-
tion of the rule is made even though theoretically sound prin-
ciple may thereby be violated. Rules of law must be capable
of reasonably practical application. Section 4, previously con-
sidered, in an example which to some extent yields a principle
of loyalty in the matter of trust deposits by a corporate trustee
for practical business reasons.
Section 8
A trustee owning corporate stock may vote it by proxy, but shall
be liable for any loss resulting to the beneficiaries from a failure to
use reasonable care in deciding how to vote the stock and in voting it.
The case law on a trustee's power to indulge in proxy voting
is somewhat obscure and conflicting."9 The practice is quite com-
mon, however, and some states have legislated favorably upon
the power. It seems rather clear that a trustee makes some
delegation of power when he votes his stock by proxy. In most
cases, however, it is not a substantial delegation of power. An
Ohio case7" requires the proxy to be accompanied by specific
directions as to the voting and leaving proxy holder only a
ministerial function to perform. The rule of this decision would
be modified by the adoption of this section.
All of the trustees falling within the probate code, however,
who hold securities, are permitted to "do all of the things which
6s z Opin. Atty. Gen. 1456 (i9z7). 40 Ohio Jur. 390.
69 BOGERT, Op. Ci., p. 1778.
7
°State ex rel Voight v. Voigkt, 2 Ohio App. 145 (1913).
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an individual holder might do." 1 The enumeration following
in that statute, having to do with exercising and selling rights,
accepting new stock in place of old, participating in reorganiza-
tion, etc., is not indicated as exclusive and hence the section
might be construed to include the voting by proxy. The legis-
lature should adopt section 8 as it would supplement and not
conflict with the existing statute. To remove all doubt, it is
suggested that voting by proxy be added to the enumeration of
General Code section 1o5o6-44. Such amendment together
with section 8 of the Uniform Act would cover the entire field
of trustees.
Section 9
A trustee owning stock may hold it in the name of a nominee,
without mention of the trust in the stock certificates or stock registra-
tion book; provided that (i) the trust records and all reports or
accounts rendered by the trustee dearly show the ownership of the
stock by the trustee and the facts regarding its holding; and (2) the
nominee shall deposit with the trustee a signed statement showing the
trust ownership, shall endorse the stock certificate in blank, and shall
not have possession of the stock certificate or access thereto except
under the immediate supervision of the trustee. The trustee shall be
personally liable for any loss to the trust resulting from any act of
such nominee in connection with stock so held.
This section in previous preliminary drafts of the Trust Act
was much more comprehensive than the final form, in that it
permitted the trustee to hold shares in his own name without
in any way showing the trust. Serious objection would exist to
such a broad change of the law. Recent practices by trust com-
panies in this state72 and a few cases growing out of those prac-
tices show the soundness of the rules which require a clear ear-
marking of trust properties by the trustee,7" and demonstrate
71 Ohio Gen. Code, sec. I05o6-44.
7 2 See Ullmerv. Fulton, 1?9 Ohio St. 323, 195 N.E. 557 (i935); 33
Mich. L. Rev. 1118 (1935); 9 Cin. L. Rev. 490 (1935); Arend v. Fulton,
53 Ohio App. 503, 5 N.E. (2) 792 (1936); Lima First Trust Co. v. Graham,
54 Ohio App. 85, 5 Ohio Op. 232 (1932).
7' BOrFGRT, op. cit., sec. 596.
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the lack of wisdom in any very substantial change relaxing the
ordinary strict rules. The proposed section, however, is not a
serious departure from sound principle. It only applies to the
narrow case of stock taken in the name of a nominee. The
provisos afford a fairly thorough safeguard to the beneficiary
in that ample evidence of the trust would exist. There may be
a practical need for such modification in the interest of ease of
transfer. It is a way of avoiding the rather strict requirements
of stock exchanges that where stock is held in the name of a
fiduciary elaborate proof of the power of the fiduciary to sell
must accompany the request for transfer. Under this section
the trustee may, so far as exchanges are concerned, hold stock
in the trust in the name of a nominee. Only those dealing in
the administration of trusts wherein considerable blocks of com-
mon stocks are held will know the merits or need of this section.
Section z o
Unless it is otherwise provided by the trust instrument, or an
amendment thereto, or by court order, all powers of a trustee shall
be attached to the office and shall not be personal.
Powers given to trustees in trust instruments are wholly
within the control of the settlor. The difficulty is that so fre-
quently in drafting the instrument important matters such as
the provision for succeeding trustees, the provision for the pass-
ing of tide to them, if named or provided for, and the trans-
mission of powers to them is overlooked entirely or done in
such a manner that a law suit is necessary to settle the prob-
lems.7" This section is designed to make all powers given in
the trust instrument presumptively attach to the office instead
of being personal in the trustee named. While in the usual
case 7 the courts seem to indicate a presumption similar to that
here provided, even where the power is discretionary, it will
very much expedite the uninterrupted administration of trusts
" See Reichert v. The Mo. & Ill. Coal Co., 231 Ill. z38 (1907).
7 ; Ar. LAW INST., RESTATEMENT OF TRusrs, sec. 196; BOGERT, Op. Cit.,
cec. 553.
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if the succeeding trustee may rely upon a dear cut statutory
rule. Under this section he may proceed with safety unless the
trust instrument or a court order specifically makes the power
in the original trustee personal.
So far as Ohio cases and statutes are concerned the proposed
section would not be out of harmony with the existing law. In
general, the Ohio cases state that the trust powers are exercis-
able by a successor, 6 even though discretion may be involved,7
unless they are made peculiarly personal in the original
trustee."8
The probate code provides that a successor "fiduciary when
appointed shall execute the trust to its proper termination,""
and that the survivor or survivors of multiple fiduciaries "shall
execute the trust" unless the court or trust instrument otherwise
provides.8 These sections may fall short of making all powers
adhere in the office. An adoption of section 1o would set the
matter at rest so far as trustees in general are concerned and it
might aid in interpreting General Code sections 105o6-55 and
56 above cited. It would be advisable to amend these sections
by using the same language as in section IO thereby securing
absolute clarity and uniformity.
Section ix
i. Unless it is otherwise provided by the trust instrument, or an
amendment thereof, or by court order, any power vested in three or
more trustees may be exercised by a majority of such trustees; but no
trustee who has not joined in exercising a power shall be liable to the
76 Clark v. Neil, 19 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 449 (1917). (This case seems to
make the power to convey attach to the office, in exact accord with the statute).
Avery v. Howard, 7 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 97 (19o8). (Says power exercisable by
successor). See 40 Ohio Jur., sec. 171, p. 431.
" Sowers v. Cyrenius, 39 Ohio St. z9 (1883). (Successor or survivor-
trustee may exercise discretion to choose a charity to benefit, no intention
having been shown to make such power peculiarly personal to the original
trustee).
78 In re King, 17 Ohio Dec. N.P. 403 (19o6); Rogers v. Rea, 98 Ohio
St. 35 (i958).
7' Ohio Gen. Code, sec. 10506-55.
80 Same, sec. Io5o6-56.
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beneficiaries or to others for the consequences of such exercise, nor
shall a dissenting trustee be liable for the consequences of an act in
which he joins at the direction of the majority trustees, if he expressed
his dissent in writing to any of his co-trustees at or before the time of
such joinder.
2. Nothing in this section shall excuse a co-trustee from liability
for inactivity in the administration of the trust nor for failure to
attempt to prevent a breach of trust.
This section is a direct reversal of the common law rule
which required multiple trustees to act jointly.8 To this com-
mon law rule there were certain exceptions. It did not apply to
charitable trusts and, in the case of urgent necessity, even in
private trusts it was not observed. In so far as the Ohio courts
have ruled upon the question they have followed the common
law.
8 2
The commissioners declared that it was intended by this
section to "abolish a rule founded on the mediaeval incidents
of joint tenancy." This would be a sufficient explanation if such
source were the sole basis for the rule. It is believed, however,
that a desire on the part of courts to further the settlor's inten-
tion and purpose in having multiple trustees had something to
do with its establishment. The fact that he named more than
one trustee would seem to manifest a desire on the settlor's part
to secure the benefits of their combined judgment and experi-
ence. The difficulties frequently encountered in securing united
action from multiple trustees have presented a practical admin-
istrative stumbling-block which is believed to outweigh the
importance of safeguarding the settlor's intent in this respect.
In reality the statute but shifts the burden. Under the new
provision it is expressly stipulated that the settlor may require
unitary action by the several trustees through affirmative pro-
vision in the trust instrument. This statutory change has been
accomplished in Georgia and New Hampshire.83
8
"A . LAW INST., RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS, sec. 194, BOGERT, Op. Cit.,
sec. 554.
82 4o Ohio Jur. 169.
83 BOGERT, Op. Cit., sec. 554, n. 35.
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An Ohio statute" of limited application now provides that
when multiple executors are named in a will and are directed
to sell land, and one or more of them dies, declines to act or
neglects to execute the will, sales made by those who took upon
themselves the execution of the will shall be as valid as if the
others had joined.
The second paragraph is very essential to section i i in that
it eliminates the difficulty of the negligent or careless trustee
which might be implicit in the main section.
Section 17
The settlor of any trust affected by this Act may, by provision in
the instrument creating the trust if the trust was created by a writing,
or by oral statement to the trustee at the time of the creation of the
trust if the trust was created orally, or by an amendment of the trust
if the settlor reserved the power to amend the trust, relieve his trustee
from any or all of the duties, restrictions, and liabilities which would
otherwise be imposed upon him by this Act; or alter or deny to his
trustee any or all of the privileges and powers conferred upon the
trustee by this Act; or add duties, restrictions, liabilities, privileges,
or powers, to those imposed or granted by this Act; but no act of the
settlor shall relieve a trustee from the duties, restrictions, and liabil-
ities imposed upon him by Sections 3, 4, and 5 of this Act.
Section r8
Any beneficiary of a trust affected by this Act may, if of full
legal capacity and acting upon full information, by written instru-
ment delivered to the trustee relieve the trustee as to such beneficiary
from any or all of the duties, restrictions, and liabilities which would
otherwise be imposed on the trustee by this Act, except as to the duties,
restrictions, and liabilities imposed by Sections 3, 4, and 5 of this Act.
Any such beneficiary may release the trustee from liability to such
beneficiary for past violations of any of the provisions of this Act.
Section x9
A court of competent jurisdiction may, for cause shown and upon
notice to the beneficiaries, relieve a trustee from any or all of the
duties and restrictions which would otherwise be placed upon him by
84 Gen. Code, sec. IO5O4-82.
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this Act, or wholly or partly excuse a trustee who has acted honestly
and reasonably from liability for violations of the provisions of this
Act.
It is believed that the purpose of these sections is a good
one, and also that the exception of sections 3, 4, and 5 from the
provisions of sections 17 and 18 is very wise. It is highly desir-
able to preserve the freedom of the settlor to make such pro-
visions as meet his requirements and desires in the creation of
the trust. It is equally desirable to permit a fully capable bene-
ficiary, as the person most concerned with the successful opera-
tion of the trust, to consent to acts of his trustee in the course
of the administration which may be advantageous, providing
that he does so upon facts fully disclosed. That the court should
have full power to permit or approve action by the trustee is
fundamental. The three sections secure these desiderata for all
parts of the Act, excepting only the requirements of sections 3,
4, and 5. For the exception of these in sections 17 and 18 there
seems to be good reason. Trusts are frequently drawn on forms
prepared by the trustee, particularly by the corporate trustee.
When this is done clauses permitting self-dealing may not
always be significant to the settlor. By way of analogy, the
cases mirror abuse of the exculpatory provision by a number of
corporate trustees." It is useless to impose new obligations and
strict prohibitions and then to permit the persons subjected
thereto to stipulate them away. To point out that a settlor who
is dissatisfied with such stipulations would insist that they be
eliminated, and hence that his failure to object makes the pro-
visions his own, is unconvincing. Where the trust instrument
is on a form prepared by the trustee it may be executed by the
unskilled settlor, who does not seek independent advice, with-
out a full understanding of the significance of its minute pro-
visions. Much the same point can be maderegarding application
by the trustee to the beneficiary for sanction of self-dealing. It
is submitted that these possibilities, and not the usual course of
ss BOGERT, Op. Cit., sec. 542; ibid., pp. 1712-1713.
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scrupulous fair dealing, should weigh in favor of the salutary
rule adopted by these sections. If the trustee is in anty case to
be relieved of the duties, restrictions and liabilities contained in
sections 3, 4, and 5, it should be done by a court having super-
vision over the administration of the trust."8 That this may be
done is the plain inference of section 19, which deals with the
power of the court to relieve the trustee and fails to list the
exceptions made in the two preceding sections. It is therefore
believed by the writers that these three sections should be
adopted as they stand.
The penalties provided for violation of the Act are ample.
Section 2 provides: "If a trustee violates any of the provisions
of this Act, he may be removed and denied compensation in
whole or in part; and any beneficiary, co-trustee or successor
trustee may treat the violation as a breach of trust." The re-
maining sections, 21 to 25, deal with Uniformity of Interpre-
tation, Short Title, Severability of sections, Repeal, and Time
of Taking Effect.
The writers commend this Act to the Ohio Legislature for
its careful consideration and passage in the belief that a sub-
stantial improvement in the trust law of the state will thereby
be achieved.
" See Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 51
(1936), at pp. 533-535; compare, ibid., pP. 526-7, 536-7, 542. See also
the provisions regarding permission for self dealing by private, as compared
with corporate, fiduciaries in the present probate code, sec. 105o6-49, referred
to in the discussion of sec. 5, supra.
